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O P I N I O N  
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
Orlando Fernandez Taveras petitions for review of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) June 2012 order of 
removal. The removal order was based on two convictions for 
petty larceny, both crimes of moral turpitude under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).  The BIA rejected 
Fernandez Taveras’s argument that he was eligible for 
adjustment of status or waiver of inadmissibility under § 
212(h) of the INA, notwithstanding a 1999 drug conviction.  
Fernandez Taveras urged that, because he had previously 
been granted a cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(a), 
the conviction that formed the basis of the prior removal 
proceedings—his 1999 drug conviction—had been “waived” 
and could not be relied upon in the later proceeding to render 
him statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status and § 212(h) 
waiver.  The Immigration Judge agreed with Fernandez 
Taveras, but the BIA reversed.  Fernandez Taveras’s petition 
raises this issue, and for the reasons that follow, we will deny 
his petition. 
I. 
Fernandez Taveras, a native and citizen of the 
Dominican Republic, entered the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident in February 1978.  He was one year old at 
the time, and has since left the country only twice—once at 
age five and again at age thirteen.  In December 2009, he 
married a United States citizen.  He also is a father of two 
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children who are United States citizens:  a fifteen-year-old 
daughter from a prior relationship, and a five-year-old 
daughter with his wife.  Additionally, he has other family ties 
in the United States, including his mother, siblings, aunts, and 
cousins, who are citizens or lawful permanent residents of the 
United States. 
 
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
initiated removal proceedings against Fernandez Taveras in 
2003 based upon his 1999 conviction under New York state 
law for criminal possession of a controlled substance, 
specifically, crack cocaine (the “1999 drug conviction”).  The 
DHS sought to remove Fernandez Taveras as an alien 
deportable for a controlled substance violation, other than a 
single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 
grams or less of marijuana, pursuant to INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  Fernandez Taveras sought 
cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(a), which provides relief from removal for certain 
permanent residents who can demonstrate a lengthy physical 
presence and substantial ties in the United States, and have 
not committed an aggravated felony.  INA § 240A(a), 8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
1
  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) granted 
his application for cancellation of removal in 2004, which 
terminated the removal proceedings. 
 
Over five years later, in January 2010, the DHS 
instituted a second removal proceeding against Fernandez 
Taveras.  This time, the Notice to Appear charged Fernandez 
Taveras with removability under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 
                                              
1
Fernandez Taveras’s 1999 drug conviction was not an 
aggravated felony. 
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U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), as an alien deportable for 
committing two or more crimes involving moral turpitude 
(“CIMT”).  Specifically, Fernandez Taveras’s removal 
proceedings arose from two convictions in 2006 and 2008 for 
petit larceny under New York state law. 
 
Fernandez Taveras admitted the factual allegations in 
the Notice to Appear, and conceded that he was removable as 
charged.  Fernandez Taveras then sought relief from removal 
by filing an application for adjustment of status under INA 
§ 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), and an application for a waiver 
of inadmissibility under INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).
2
  
 
The IJ issued an oral decision finding that Fernandez 
Taveras was removable as an alien deportable for committing 
two CIMT as defined in the statute.  However, the IJ granted 
Fernandez Taveras a § 212(h) waiver and granted his 
application for adjustment of status.  Because Fernandez 
Taveras’s 1999 drug conviction had been the basis for the 
prior proceedings, which resulted in the cancellation of 
removal, the IJ accepted Fernandez Taveras’s argument that 
he had essentially received a “waiver” of that conviction such 
that he could no longer be found inadmissible for that offense 
                                              
2
 Having already received a grant of cancellation of removal 
in his first removal proceedings, Fernandez Taveras was 
ineligible for a second cancellation of removal.  See INA 
§ 240A(c)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(6) (providing that 
§ 240A(a) “shall not apply to any . . . alien whose removal 
has previously been cancelled under this section”). 
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under INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), or ineligible for § 212(h) waiver.
3
   
 
The IJ rejected the contrary view of the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in De Hoyos v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 339, 342 
(5th Cir. 2008), finding it distinguishable, in part, because, in 
the IJ’s view, it did not account for the INA’s statutory 
scheme, particularly § 101(a)(13)(C)(v), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(13)(C)(v).  As we discuss below, this provision 
governs matters concerning whether lawful permanent 
residents reentering the United States are “seeking 
admission.”  The IJ, however, read § 101(a)(13)(C)(v) to 
apply to an alien seeking adjustment of status, and to suggest 
“that once a waiver is granted for an offense under Section 
240A(a) of the INA, that that alien will not be subsequently 
inadmissible for that offense.”  App. at 49.  Accordingly, the 
IJ concluded, Fernandez Taveras was “statutorily eligible to 
apply for adjusting of status and for a waiver under Section 
212(h) of the INA, notwithstanding his drug conviction, 
which would [otherwise] render him inadmissible under 
Section 212(a)(2) of the INA for a drug offense that cannot be 
waived under Section 212(h) of the INA.”  Id.  
 
The DHS appealed the IJ’s decision, and the BIA 
agreed with the DHS that Fernandez Taveras was ineligible to 
adjust his status and receive a § 212(h) waiver due to his 1999 
                                              
3
 While the 1999 drug conviction was not an aggravated 
felony that would statutorily disqualify him from cancellation 
of removal, as we discuss below, it would render him 
ineligible for a § 212(h) waiver and prevent him from 
meeting the admissibility prerequisite for an adjustment of 
status. 
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drug conviction.  The BIA concluded that the IJ had erred in 
his “interpretation of the law” by determining that a “grant of 
cancellation of removal in prior removal proceedings 
precluded consideration of his drug possession conviction” in 
connection with Fernandez Taveras’s application for 
adjustment of status.  App. at 3.  This determination, the BIA 
concluded, was at odds with the Board’s controlling 
precedent, particularly, Matter of Balderas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 
389 (BIA 1991), which, the BIA explained, instructs “that a 
waiver of inadmissibility or deportability waives only the 
ground charged, but not the underlying basis for 
removability.”  App. at 5.  Under Balderas’s rationale, 
Fernandez Taveras’s prior drug conviction could statutorily 
constitute an underlying basis for inadmissibility and render 
him ineligible for a § 212(h) waiver.  Id.
4
  The BIA also 
rejected the notion that that the enactment of § 101(a)(13)(C) 
somehow affected Balderas’s “longstanding principle,” 
instead, concluding that it applied to an entirely different 
procedural situation, as we discuss below.  Id. 
 
Considering Fernandez Taveras’s applications for 
adjustment of status and § 212(h) waiver in light of his 1999 
drug conviction, the BIA concluded that his “drug possession 
conviction clearly renders him inadmissible under section 
212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Act, so he is not statutorily eligible 
for adjustment of status” nor eligible for a Section 212(h) 
waiver.  Id.  The BIA sustained the DHS’s appeal, vacated the 
IJ’s decision, and ordered Fernandez Taveras’s removal from 
the United States to the Dominican Republic. 
                                              
4
 As we note below, Balderas was decided under the former 
INA § 212(c) but the BIA had little difficulty applying it to a 
§ 212(h) waiver situation. 
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Fernandez Taveras timely filed this petition for review 
of the BIA’s order. 
II. 
We have general jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(1) to review a final order of removal against an alien.  
Generally, we lack jurisdiction to review a final order of 
removal against an alien who has been convicted of certain 
criminal offenses.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  However, we 
retain jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) to 
“review . . . constitutional claims or questions of law raised 
upon a petition for review,” and apply de novo review, 
subject to applicable canons of deference.  Santos-Reyes v. 
Att’y Gen., 660 F.3d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 
III. 
As illustrated by the divergent rulings of the IJ and 
BIA, whether Fernandez Taveras qualifies for relief from 
removal hinges on whether his 1999 drug conviction 
continues to constitute grounds of ineligibility for adjustment 
of status and § 212(h) waiver, notwithstanding the earlier 
grant of § 240A(a) cancellation of removal.  Fernandez 
Taveras cannot meet the statutory requirements for 
adjustment of status and § 212(h) waiver  if we conclude that 
the 1999 drug conviction was appropriately considered.  The 
1999 drug conviction would be a basis for Fernandez 
Taveras’s inadmissibility under § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) for 
having violated a law “relating to a controlled substance.” 8 
U.S.C.§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).  Similarly, a § 212(h) waiver 
could not apply to “waive the application of . . . subparagraph 
(A)(i)(II)” because the 1999 drug conviction did not “relate[] 
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to a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of 
marijuana.”  8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).  And, without the 
availability of a § 212(h) waiver, his inadmissibility would 
render him ineligible for adjustment of status and thus relief 
from removal.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(2) (mandating as a 
prerequisite for adjustment of status that an alien “is 
admissible to the United States for permanent residence”).5 
Fernandez Taveras argues that the IJ correctly 
excluded his 1999 drug conviction from his second removal 
proceeding because he had received a cancellation of removal 
under § 240A(a) in a previous proceeding based on that 
conviction. Fernandez Taveras urges that the  § 240A(a)  
grant of relief should have preclusive effect in any subsequent 
removal proceeding, barring the use of the same conviction as 
a later ground for inadmissibility and ineligibility for 
                                              
5
As an alternative argument on appeal, Fernandez Taveras 
contends that he was denied due process for lack of 
opportunity to establish his admissibility, and specifically, to 
challenge his inadmissibility on the basis of his 1999 drug 
conviction.  Fernandez Taveras does not dispute that he 
received the 1999 drug conviction and that it was the grounds 
for his first removal proceeding.  Appellant Br. at 8-9; App. at 
16.  However, he claims that the factual determination of this 
conviction was without sufficient documentary evidence from 
the prior removal proceedings.  Appellant Br. at 37. We fail 
to see how due process was denied when none of the facts of 
Fernandez Taveras’s convictions, and particularly his 1999 
drug conviction, are in dispute.  Rather, Fernandez Taveras 
only disputes matters of law relating to his drug conviction, 
including whether he is statutorily eligible for admissibility—
issues which we address in this opinion. 
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removal. The DHS advocates for the BIA’s view that a 
previous § 240A(a) cancellation of removal does not have 
such preclusive effect. We agree and conclude that § 240A(a) 
relief merely cancelled the removal in Fernandez Taveras’s 
first removal proceeding, and has no bearing on the existence 
or effect of the 1999 drug conviction in subsequent removal 
proceedings based on other grounds. Specifically, the grant of 
§ 240A(a) relief in his first removal hearing has no bearing on 
whether that conviction can be considered in connection with 
his seeking adjustment of status and § 212(h) waiver in his 
second removal proceeding. 
In the previous removal proceeding, Fernandez 
Taveras sought cancellation of removal, notwithstanding the 
DHS’s desire to remove him based on his 1999 drug 
conviction.  A § 240A(a) cancellation allows the Attorney 
General (here, the IJ in the first removal proceeding acted in 
this capacity) to provide discretionary relief from removal by 
cancelling the removal itself.  The nature of this relief is 
delineated by the unambiguous language of the statute, which 
provides:  “The Attorney General may cancel removal in the 
case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the 
United States . . . .”  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (emphasis added).  
Thus, the removal is cancelled, nothing more.  The 
underlying conviction stands unaffected.   
 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, when addressing  
this very issue in De Hoyos, concluded that the “plain 
language suggests that the Attorney General cancels removal 
itself, not the underlying conviction” charged in the removal 
proceeding.  551 F.3d at 342.  Indeed, in spite of a 
cancellation of the removal proceeding based upon that 
conviction, the “conviction may still be a factor that relates to 
admissibility when determining [an] application for 
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adjustment of status” in a later removal proceeding.  Id.  
While the IJ expressed some disagreement with De Hoyos, 
we instead find its reasoning sound and adopt it.
6
 
 
Our interpretation of § 240A(a) is also consistent with 
the historical nature of the Attorney General’s discretionary 
authority to grant relief from deportation under the INA.  
Immigration law has long vested the Attorney General with 
broad discretion to admit aliens who were excludable for, 
inter alia, certain criminal convictions, and this discretion 
continuously has been extended to grant aliens a discretionary 
waiver from deportation.  See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 
294 (2001).  Former INA § 212(c) was one such statutory 
provision that provided for this type of discretionary relief.  
Under this provision, “if [waiver was] granted, the 
deportation proceeding . . . terminated and the alien 
remain[ed] a permanent resident.”  Id. at 295.  “Because of 
the large class of convictions that triggered removability, 
section 212(c) was frequently called upon to enable 
permanent resident aliens to remain in the country.”  Atkinson 
v. Att’y Gen., 479 F.3d 222, 226 (3d Cir. 2007).  Upon the 
enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. 104-208, 110 
Stat. 3009 (1996), provisions of the former § 212(c) were 
consolidated with other relief known as “suspension of 
deportation,” 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994), to create 
“cancellation of removal” relief under § 240A(a).  See 
Rodriguez-Munoz v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 245, 247 (3d Cir. 
                                              
6
 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly described 
cancellation of removal as “allow[ing] the Attorney General 
to cancel removal proceedings for certain resident aliens.”  
Kellermann v. Holder, 592 F.3d 700, 705 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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2005);  see also 5 Charles Gordon et al., Immigration Law 
and Procedure § 64.04 (2013) [hereinafter Immigration Law].  
 
In Balderas, the BIA explained the parameters of 
former § 212(c) relief, noting that “section 212(c) merely 
provides that an alien may be admitted to or, in the case of 
deportation proceedings, allowed to remain in the United 
States despite a finding of excludability or deportability.”  20 
I. & N. Dec. at 391.  “[S]ince a grant of section 212(c) relief 
‘waives’ the finding of excludability or deportability rather 
than the basis of the excludability itself, the crimes alleged to 
be grounds for excludability or deportability do not disappear 
from the alien’s record for immigration purposes.”  Id.  As the 
BIA further clarified, “[W]hen section 212(c) relief is 
granted, the Attorney General does not issue a pardon or 
expungement of the conviction itself.  Instead, the Attorney 
General grants the alien relief upon a determination that a 
favorable exercise of discretion is warranted on the particular 
facts presented, notwithstanding the alien’s excludability or 
deportability.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  Relying on regulations 
governing the application of a § 212(c) waiver, the BIA also 
described the waiver as indefinitely valid once granted, but 
that “relief is specific to the grounds stated [in the § 212(c) 
application] at the time of the grant of relief.”  Id. at 393.  
 
Several courts of appeals, including our own, have 
approved the limited “waiver” concept embraced by Balderas 
in the context of a § 212(c) waiver that is followed by another 
cancellation of removal proceeding, so that a prior conviction, 
which was charged as grounds for removal in a proceeding in 
which § 212(c) waiver was granted pre-IIRIRA precludes 
eligibility for § 240A cancellation of removal in a post-
IIRIRA removal proceeding.  See Duhaney v. Att’y Gen., 621 
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F.3d 340, 353 (3d Cir. 2010); Rodriguez-Munoz, 419 F.3d at 
248; see also Esquivel v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 919, 922-23 (7th 
Cir. 2008); Peralta-Taveras v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 580, 584-
85 (2d Cir. 2007); Becker v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1000, 1003 
(9th Cir. 2007); Munoz-Yepez v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 347, 350 
(8th Cir. 2006); Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 458-59 
(5th Cir. 2006).  As we noted in Duhaney v. Attorney 
General, “we have determined, relying on Balderas, that the 
fact that a petitioner’s deportation based on a particular 
conviction has been waived [by former § 212(c)] does not 
prevent subsequent consideration of the same underlying 
conviction for other purposes.”  621 F.3d at 353 (citing 
Rodriguez-Munoz, 419 F.3d at 248).  We also explained that 
“the scope of a § 212(c) waiver is defined by the basis for 
deportability, not the underlying crime itself,” id., and that 
although a “§ 212(c) waiver remains valid indefinitely, . . . it 
applies only to the basis for deportation charged in the 
[removal proceeding in which the relief was granted],” id. at 
353-54 (emphasis added).   
 
Admittedly, the statutory and procedural posture of 
this case—mainly under § 240A(a) and not § 212(c)—while 
similar to Balderas, is nonetheless different.  However, in De 
Hoyos, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether 
former § 212(c) jurisprudence should be considered 
instructive as to the effect of the grant of § 240A relief in a 
situation such as this, and found that it should.  There, an 
alien sought relief from removal by applying for adjustment 
of status, having previously been granted a § 240A(a) 
cancellation of removal in a prior removal proceeding that 
was based upon a marijuana possession conviction for an 
amount greater than 50 pounds and less than 2,000 pounds.  
De Hoyos, 551 F.3d at 340.  In the subsequent removal 
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proceedings, instituted based upon two theft convictions, the 
IJ denied De Hoyos’s application for adjustment of status, in 
part, on account of his marijuana possession conviction, 
notwithstanding his prior grant of § 240A(a) cancellation of 
removal.  Id.   
 
In denying the petition for review of the BIA’s 
removal order, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized 
that former § 212(c) jurisprudence is instructive as to the 
nature § 240A(a) relief.  Relying on its precedent approving 
Balderas, the court acknowledged that “a conviction that was 
the focus of a previous waiver under § 212(c) may still be a 
grounds of inadmissibility that statutorily precludes an alien’s 
acquisition of § 212(h) relief in further removal proceedings.”  
Id. at 342.  Our sister court concluded that “[a]lthough the 
Balderas decision applied to the predecessor of § 240A 
(former § 212(c)), the Board’s [Balderas] rationale applies 
with equal force to the effect of cancellation of removal on an 
underlying conviction.” Id. at 342-43 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
 
We agree with De Hoyos that former INA § 212(c) 
jurisprudence, and particularly Balderas, is applicable in 
determining the scope of a § 240A(a) waiver.  Thus we look 
to our case law, as described in Duhaney, concerning the 
effect of a § 212(c) waiver to inform us here.  See Duhaney, 
621 F.3d at 353-54; see also Rodriguez-Munoz, 419 F.3d at 
248.  Given that we have previously found that a former 
§ 212(c) waiver only cancels the removal proceedings for an 
alien who is inadmissible or deportable, we determine the 
same is equally true of a § 240A(a) cancellation of removal.  
Like a § 212(c) waiver, the effect of § 240A(a) relief is 
circumscribed by the grounds of the removal proceeding in 
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which the relief was granted. In Fernandez Taveras’s case, his 
§ 240A(a) relief only cancelled his removal proceeding 
arising from his 1999 drug conviction under INA 
§ 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  When 
granted, the § 240A(a) waiver did not impact the underlying 
drug conviction itself, but only the removal arising from that 
conviction.  It follows that the previous grant of § 240A(a) 
relief has no bearing upon whether Fernandez Taveras’s 1999 
drug conviction precludes him from satisfying the statutory 
requirements for adjustment of status and § 212(h) waiver 
sought in the second proceeding.  Furthermore, because 
Fernandez Taveras’s second removal proceeding is based 
upon different grounds of removability than his first removal 
proceeding—namely, he is removable for two CIMTs under 
INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)—his 
prior § 240A(a) relief has no bearing on the second removal 
proceeding.  By contrast, because § 240A(a) relief is limited 
to the grounds of removal, if his second removal had arisen 
from the same exact grounds for removability as his prior 
removal proceeding, i.e., his 1999 drug conviction alone 
under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), then his previous § 240A(a) 
waiver would bar that removal proceeding.   
 
Fernandez Taveras urges, however, that we should 
adopt the IJ’s view that INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(v) changes the 
calculus and should lead us to conclude that the INA’s 
framework affords § 240A(a) relief that is broader than what 
we just described.  Section 101(a)(13)(C)(v) provides that a 
lawful permanent resident “shall not be regarded as seeking 
admission” when the alien has committed a criminal offense 
that renders him inadmissible but thereafter has been granted 
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an adjustment of status or cancellation of removal relief.
7
  8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v).  Somehow equating an 
application for adjustment of status with “seeking an 
admission,” Fernandez Taveras claims that this provision 
applies to him.  He contends that, having been granted 
§ 240A(a) relief, there is no need to find him admissible—at 
least in relation to his 1999 drug conviction—in connection 
with his application for adjustment of status.   
 
The BIA correctly rejected this same argument, 
concluding that this provision does not apply to applications 
for adjustment of status in removal proceedings and is 
actually not relevant to the scope of § 240A(a) relief.  Indeed, 
as the BIA recognized, “section 101(a)(13)(C)(v) is 
inapposite to the situation of a lawful permanent resident, 
such as the respondent, who was granted cancellation of 
                                              
7
 This provision states: 
An alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence in the United States shall not be 
regarded as seeking an admission into the 
United States for purposes of the 
immigration laws unless the alien— 
. . . 
(v) has committed an offense identified in 
section 1182(a)(2) of this title, unless since 
such offense the alien has been granted 
relief under section 1182(h) [INA § 212(h)] 
or 1229b(a) [INA § 240A(a)] of this title . . . 
. 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v).   
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removal after the commission of an offense identified in 
section 212(a) of the Act and later seeks to apply for 
adjustment of status in new removal proceedings after being 
found removable.”  App. at 3.   
 
This is because the “admission” to which 
§ 101(a)(13)(C) refers is an entirely different and unrelated 
immigration procedure from adjustment of status.  
Adjustment of status under INA § 245(a) serves to allow an 
alien who is already physically located in the United States 
after inspection and admittance or parole to obtain lawful 
permanent resident status while remaining within the United 
States without having to go abroad to obtain an immigrant 
visa at a United States consulate.  See Malik v. Att’y Gen., 
659 F.3d 253, 257 (3d Cir. 2011).  Aliens, like Fernandez 
Taveras, invoke this procedure in removal proceedings to 
seek relief from removal.  
 
By contrast, as the BIA explained, the “purpose of 
section 101(a)(13)(C) is to regulate the circumstances under 
which returning lawful permanent residents may reenter the 
United States, upon inspection, without being classified as 
applicants for admission.” App. at 3.8 Ordinarily under the 
                                              
8
 This view is consistent with the BIA’s prior statements on § 
101(a)(13)(C).  See Matter of Collado-Munoz, 21 I. & N. 
Dec. 1061, 1065 (BIA 1998) (“[T]he . . . section specifically 
defines the circumstances under which a returning lawful 
permanent resident will be deemed to be seeking admission 
into the United States.”); Matter of Guzman Martinez, 25 I. & 
N. Dec. 845, 846 (BIA 2012) (“[S]ection 101(a)(13)(C) of the 
Act establishes a presumption against treating a returning 
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INA’s statutory scheme, “[a]n alien present in the United 
States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United 
States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . . ) 
shall be deemed . . . an applicant for admission.” INA 
§ 235(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).  At that time the alien 
must establish “clearly and beyond a doubt” entitlement to be 
admitted.  INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).  
However, § 101(a)(13)(C) provides aliens, who have 
previously been admitted and hold legal permanent resident 
status, with an exception to this rule when they seek to re-
enter the United States at a port of entry after temporarily 
leaving the country.  In such cases, the legal permanent 
resident “shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into 
the United States for purposes of the immigration laws” 
unless he or she falls into one of the six categories under 
§ 101(a)(13)(C), such as having committed a criminal 
offense.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C).  “Returning lawful 
permanent residents are thus presumptively entitled to retain 
that status upon reentry.”  Tineo v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382, 
386 (3d Cir. 2003).  However, “[i]f a lawful permanent 
resident falls into one of the six subsections, the clear import 
of [§ 101(a)(13)(C)] is that he is stripped of his lawful 
permanent residence. That is, he becomes an alien seeking 
admission as if he were entering for the first time.”  Id.  
Under such circumstances, it is incumbent upon the DHS to 
sustain the burden of proving that the alien falls within one of 
the six categories by clear and convincing evidence.  See Doe 
v. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2011).9   
                                                                                                     
lawful permanent resident as an applicant for admission in 
removal proceedings.”). 
9
 Historically under immigration law, aliens were required to 
establish their admissibility upon each return to the United 
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The BIA’s recognition that § 101(a)(13)(C)(v) governs 
an entirely different and unrelated immigration procedure 
from adjustment of status is also consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s observation in Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479 
(2012), that § 101(a)(13)(C) applies only to physical reentry, 
not adjustment of status.  There, the Supreme Court described 
the provision as “attach[ing] a . . . disability (denial of 
reentry) in respect to past events” like prior convictions, and 
that under the provision “lawful permanent residents who had 
committed a crime of moral turpitude . . . [and then] 
return[ed] from brief trips abroad . . . are subject to admission 
procedures, and, potentially, to removal from the United 
States on grounds of inadmissibility.”  Id. at 1484-85.  
Indeed, the Court is in unanimity on this view of 
§ 101(a)(13)(C).  Id. at 1493 (dissenting, Scalia, J.) (“The 
operative provision of this text—the provision that specifies 
                                                                                                     
States after traveling abroad, no matter how short the sojourn; 
this was known as the “re-entry doctrine” or “entry doctrine.”  
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 
425-26 (1933); see also Immigration Law § 10.05.  The 
Supreme Court later in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 
462 (1963), recognized an exception to the doctrine’s 
admissibility requirements for lawful permanent residents 
returning from brief trips abroad.  Section 101(a)(13)(C)(v), 
by providing a similar, albeit narrower, exception to the re-
entry doctrine, is understood to codify certain aspects of 
Fleuti.  See Tineo, 350 F.3d at 395 (recognizing that § 
101(a)(13) “defines the new scheme of ‘admission,’ and it 
sets forth those circumstances under which lawful permanent 
residents may not retain their status upon reentry, thereby 
triggering removal proceedings”); see also 1 Immigration 
Law § 10.05.   
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the act that it prohibits or prescribes—says that lawful 
permanent residents convicted of [certain] offenses . . . must 
seek formal ‘admission’ before they return to the United 
States from abroad.”).   
 
Our agreement with the BIA is further bolstered by the 
statutory language itself, which reflects that “seeking 
admission” under § 101(a)(13)(C)(v) does not mean or refer 
to “adjustment of status.”  Under the INA, “[t]he terms 
‘admission’ and ‘admitted’ mean, with respect to an alien, the 
lawful entry of the alien into the United States after 
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis added).  The words 
“entry” and “into” plainly indicate that “admission” involves 
physical entrance into the country, which is inapposite to 
adjustment of status in removal proceedings, a procedure that 
is structured to take place entirely within the United States.   
 
Nonetheless, Fernandez Taveras urges that despite the 
statutory definition of “admission” under § 101(a)(13)(C), 
“entry” must be understood either as physically crossing a 
border or figuratively entering the United States.  However, 
no case cited by Fernandez Taveras in support identifies the 
two procedures—admission and adjustment of status—to be 
one and the same.  Rather, the relevant case law indicates that 
an alien can achieve the same result—lawful permanent 
resident status—by either seeking adjustment of status or 
admission, but does not suggest that the procedures are 
interchangeable.  See Matter of Alarcon, 20 I. & N. Dec. 557, 
562 (BIA 1992) (“As he is seeking to adjust his status to that 
of a lawful permanent resident, the respondent in this case is 
assimilated to the position of an applicant for entry into the 
United States.” (emphasis added)); see also Matter of Rosas-
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Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 616, 619 (BIA 1999) (“Our 
determination that aliens ‘lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence’ through the adjustment process are considered to 
have accomplished an ‘admission’ to the United States is 
supported by the language of the adjustment provisions 
themselves.” (emphasis added)).10  
Accordingly, we adopt the BIA’s view that 
§ 101(a)(13)(C)(v) does not apply to an applicant for 
adjustment of status in a removal proceeding, and thus has no 
bearing on our conclusions about the scope of § 240A(a) 
relief.  A grant of § 240A(a) relief only cancels removal in a 
removal proceeding for an inadmissible or deportable alien, 
and a conviction serving as a basis for inadmissibility or 
deportability in that earlier proceeding may constitute a basis 
for ineligibility for adjustment of status and § 212(h) waiver 
in a subsequent removal proceeding.  As such, we agree with 
the BIA that Fernandez Taveras’s 1999 drug conviction—
notwithstanding that it was charged as the basis for the prior 
removal proceeding in which Fernandez Taveras received a 
§ 240A(a) waiver—may, and does, make him ineligible for 
relief from removal.  His conviction is grounds for 
inadmissibility under INA § 212(a)(A)(i)(II) and ineligibility 
for a § 240A(a) waiver of inadmissibility.  Because 
                                              
10
Contrary to Fernandez Taveras’s claim otherwise, we do not 
read Hanif v. Attorney General, 694 F.3d 479 (3d Cir. 2012), 
which refers to “‘admission’ both as “an event or action” and 
as the “physical event of entering the country,” as suggesting 
that an adjustment of status is “an event” that constitutes an 
admission.  Id. at 485.  Rather, Hanif’s treatment of these 
concepts is consistent with the notion that admission under 
§ 101(a)(13)(A) pertains to seeking physical entry at a border. 
Id. 
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Fernandez Taveras is inadmissible, he cannot meet the 
prerequisites for adjustment of status.  Accordingly, we will 
deny the petition for review. 
